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Advice and Indecision
Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis
B R A D  G L A D M A N  & 
P E T E R  M.  A R C H A M B A U L T
Abstract: The confusion surrounding Canada’s response to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis is well documented. Canadian political leadership hesitated 
to close ranks with our closest ally in defence of the continent. However, 
by misinterpreting what could have been done, or blaming the lack of an 
approved Department of National Defence War Book as the chief culprit 
for the extended delay, the literature does not adequately account for the 
confused response. This paper will show that useable measures existed by 
which the Chiefs of Staff Committee could have raised service readiness 
levels without appealing to Cabinet. By accounting for the confusion evident 
at the highest levels of decision-making, the paper illuminates the degree of 
laziness in strategic thought that characterized the nation’s war planning.
W i t h  t h e  f i f t i e t h  anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis recently past, it is fitting to look back at some of the 
assumptions underpinning the accepted national narrative on 
Canada’s part in those events.1 That narrative focuses on the lengthy 
debates in the Canadian Cabinet over raising the alert levels of the 
Canadian Forces (c f ) that delayed action to meet the Soviet threat 
in October 1962. What scholars have ignored or treated superficially 
were the Government of Canada approved measures in place at the 
time to help ready the military and the country to meet rapidly
1 Much of the material in this paper comes from Brad Gladman and Peter 
Archambault, Confronting ‘the Essence of Decision’: Canada and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Ottawa: DRDC-CORA TM 2010-250, 2011).
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developing crises without appeal to Cabinet for a declaration of a 
formal alert.2 Those measures were not used in this instance. It will 
thus be suggested that while Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker 
bears responsibility for a confused decision-making structure, one 
characterised by the avoidance and mistrust of military advice, he 
was as much the victim of that structure as its engineer. The climate 
of hostility Diefenbaker’s attitudes generated created a situation 
where both political and military leaders were too willing to accept 
justifications for inaction in the face of what surely was a clear and 
present danger to North America. In that context, bad military advice 
precipitated the lengthy and needless Cabinet debate and delay in 
raising the readiness of the Canadian Forces in lock-step with our 
ally in continental defence, all of which convinced Washington that 
Canada was a shaky partner. This perception seems to have endured 
long after the crisis ended. It contains stark lessons for today’s 
military decision-makers and those providing decision-support.
The background to and course of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis 
has been adequately covered in the existing historiography.3 Not
2 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Boston : Little, Brown, 1971) ; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edition (New York : Addison- 
Wesley Longman, 1999) ; James M. Minifie, Open at the Top: Reflections on US- 
Canada Relations (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964); John W. Warnock, 
Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 
1970); Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Toronto: Longmans, 1968); Peyton 
Lyon, “The Cold War : Cuba-October 1962,” Canada in World Affairs, 1961-63 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968); Peyton Lyon, “Prime Minister Diefenbaker 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Thomas A. Hockin, ed., Apex of Power: The Prime 
Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (Scarborough : Prentice Hall, 1977) ; 
Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1963) ; Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian 
Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto : The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 
1993); Jon B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems 
of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Sean M. 
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons during the Cold 
War (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007).
3 For examples of this voluminous literature, see Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966); John M. Young, When the Russians Blinked: The 
U.S. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington : History and 
Museum Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991); Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and 
David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989 (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science 
and International Affairs, 1991) ; Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy 
and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York : Edward Burlingame Books, 1991) ; James 
Daniel, Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis (New York: Holt,
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surprisingly, much of the narrative focuses on the game of chicken 
between the two Cold War superpowers. By contrast, the literature 
on Canada’s involvement in the crisis, and more specifically on Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker’s decisions, is surprisingly sparse. Moreover, 
later accounts, including Diefenbaker’s memoirs, seem at odds 
with other versions of the events, leading to confusion over what 
influenced the decision to delay approving increased readiness for 
the Canadian forces. Most accounts attribute Diefenbaker’s delay to 
a lack of appreciation of the nature of the threat ; anger at a lack 
of consultation by the US that blinded Canadian leadership to the 
threat, or suggest that poor consultation on the part of Washington 
was a convenient excuse for Canada’s behaviour, the only post facto 
defence available for Diefenbaker who had so badly gauged Canadian 
public support for the US and its handling of this incident. Most 
accounts have assumed that the military was not culpable in the 
confused Canadian response.4 The present article, however, argues 
that it was poor military advice that directly led to the lengthy and 
unnecessary Cabinet debates which followed.
Any narrative of Canada’s role in the crisis must begin with 
intelligence reports that showed the Soviets were installing ballistic 
missiles in Cuba capable of hitting US and Canadian targets. Those
Rinehart and Winston, 1963); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Edward C. Keefer, Charles 
S. Sampson and Louis J. Smith. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, 
vol.9: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1996) ; Dan Caldwell, The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis 
Management (Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corp, 1989); Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to 
Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 
1991); Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1974) ; David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (New York : Crowell, 
1979) ; Herbert Samuel Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis, October 1962 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976); Robert A. Divine, ed., The Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New York: M. Wiener Publishers, 1988); Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1993) ; Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle 
Over Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); William J. Medland, The Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary (New York: Praeger, 1988); Anatoli I. Gribkov, 
Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Chicago: Edition Q, 1994); Robert Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The 
Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York : 
Simon & Schuster, 1992) ; Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1996).
4 For instance, see Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian 
Involvement Reconsidered.
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reports forced President John Kennedy to establish an American naval 
quarantine of the island and threaten further action if preparation of 
the sites continued. Existing accounts argue that tensions between 
the Kennedy administration and the Diefenbaker government over 
Canada’s failure to cut ties with Communist Cuba and Diefenbaker’s 
belief that the US position on Cuba was unbalanced, caused Kennedy 
to inform the Canadians only an hour and a half in advance of 
the blockade announcement.5 As historian Richard Neustadt has 
noted, so began the spiral effect of “muddled perceptions, stifled 
communications, and disappointed expectations.”6
The outcome was the Canadian government’s hesitation in 
responding to the American request to increase the Canadian Forces 
alert status to Defence Condition (d e f c o n ) 3. Only after lengthy 
debates on 23-24 October did the Canadian Cabinet finally and very 
quietly acquiesce. The existing historiography consistently paints 
a picture of Canadian political leadership fearing that a Canadian 
alert would further provoke the Soviets, especially in the context of 
what many in the Canadian Cabinet felt were unbalanced American 
policies towards Cuba. These fears, the argument continues, combined 
with anger over a lack of advance consultation and concerns about 
implications for Canadian policy on nuclear weapons, all of which 
reportedly contributed to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green’s reluctance 
to agree to Kennedy’s request. As the Soviet ships approached the 
quarantine zone later in the week, however, the insistence of the 
minister of national defence, Douglas Harkness, on the need for action 
gained support and the prime minister finally approved the alert.
5 This argument appears in many sources to varying degrees of importance as a 
factor in how events unfolded. For examples of this see Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, 
“Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Pacific Historical 
Review 48, no. 2 (May 1979): 160-161; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, 
Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, 218, Robert Reford, Canada and 
Three Crises (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 147-217, 
and J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and 
the United States to the lggos (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 203-204. 
It must also be noted that security concerns prevented President Kennedy from 
notifying any of his key allies earlier, but that Diefenbaker felt continental defence 
matters and the NORAD agreement required earlier consultation.
6 Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, 
1970h 56.
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As is frequently argued, Canada’s hesitant response reflected 
in part the desire of the prime minister and others to preserve 
the independence of Canadian foreign policy and to maintain a 
balanced posture in crisis conditions. Diefenbaker and his advisors 
were determined to uphold Canadian sovereignty, and thus did not 
wish to be seen as being too close to the American position. The 
delay, however, was widely criticised both at the time and since as 
contributing to a growing perception of the indecisiveness of the 
Diefenbaker government during a crisis that was as much a threat 
to Canada as the US. Moreover, the government’s response to the 
crisis exacerbated the already difficult relations with the Kennedy 
administration. While Diefenbaker and former President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower had shared a warm relationship, the prime minister 
enjoyed no such rapport with the “Imperial President” Kennedy. 
Their relationship, frosty at best, may have clouded and complicated 
discussions about the threat to the continent posed by Communist 
missiles and what to do about it. The literature raises these issues but 
does not address them in depth.
Notably lacking in the literature is consideration of what 
information and analysis the Diefenbaker cabinet sought, what 
was actually provided to them. That in turn raises the question 
whether flaws in the processes in place to supply this essential 
material to Cabinet may have contributed -  perhaps fundamentally 
-  to the resulting fiasco. More generally, scholars have ignored or 
misunderstood the efforts of Canada’s Cold War military in the years 
prior to the confrontation over Cuba to modify Canada’s strategic 
posture and develop measures with which to respond to crises 
without delay. These early efforts included attempts to modify the 
Government War Books from the Second World War to provide the 
military with the means to deal effectively with the Soviet nuclear 
threat and rapidly developing crises.
After the Second World War, Canada’s overall strategic concept 
was based on its traditional one of mobilization, rather than on the 
maintenance of large forces in-being. The three services maintained 
cadre forces to allow for the rapid expansion of the Militia, Naval 
Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force in the event of war. Ships and 
aircraft were mothballed, while the resources for several army divisions 
were stored at various sites throughout the country. The mobilization 
plan called for the activation of an army roughly the same size and 
shape as the First Canadian Army deployed in Northwest Europe in
5
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1944-45. Several factors prevented the Militia from maintaining the 
numbers necessary for such mobilization in peacetime, not least were 
high employment rates in the postwar boom years.7
The concept of national, and even military, mobilization had 
changed with the advent of nuclear weapons and the possibility 
of attack with little or no warning. The commitment of national 
resources to war remained, of course, the responsibility of the state, 
and as always included political, social, economic, industrial and 
military components. In the Cold War, planners were influenced 
by the concept of total war, as it had played out in various forms 
between 1914 and 1945. Centralized control of national assets, geared 
toward total victory, had been applied by all combatants, including 
Canada. O f course, the concept of military mobilization in Canada 
is tarnished by the memory of Sam Hughes, who, as minister of 
militia, ignored existing mobilization plans and implemented his 
own, making him the target of much criticism. The difficulty of 
maintaining adequate capacity to mobilize the military continued to 
be a particular problem for the Army well into the Cold War, as it 
faced the challenge of balancing requirements to respond quickly to 
crises and the political need to sustain the framework for mobilization 
of reserve units across the country for longer term preparations.
Nonetheless, Canada and the United States recognized the need 
for quick decision-making in the event of a threat to the continent 
as early as 1947. The Canada-US Basic Security Plan, agreed to in 
that year, outlined an operational plan for Canadian and US forces 
“in the event of a threat to the security of the Northern part of the 
Western Hemisphere.” In short, it articulated the defensive portions 
of a war plan for those areas which could be placed in effect when 
so directed by the two governments. The Basic Security Plan also 
provided for long-term planning and routine analysis of the evolving 
threat appreciation by both parties, based on the mutual assessment 
that a potential enemy would not be able to deliver “weapons of 
mass destruction in significant quantity on vital areas of Canada and 
the United States” until 1952. In the event of enemy aggression, the 
Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee, created shortly after 
the war to coordinate planning, recommended that the “ultimate
7 Hon. John A. Fraser, In Service of the Nation: Canada’s Army Reserves for the 
21st Century, a report presented to the Minister of National Defence, the Hon. Art 
Eggleton, May 2000.
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objective of any war effort of both countries is to seize the offensive 
with the maximum practicable strength in the minimum length of 
time.” As such, an “acceptable state of readiness” could be achieved, 
with “purely defensive measures” held to “the absolute minimum.”8 
Canadian governments generally agreed that defensive and 
mobilization capabilities were not a priority by the way they treated 
the reserve mobilization framework, particularly the Militia, in the 
years between 1945 and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Over the next 
few years, as the Soviets demonstrated their atomic capability and 
the Canadian military had to undergo “peacetime” mobilization for 
the Korean War and the n a t o  Integrated Force in Europe, strategic 
planning became more focussed on the likelihood of a nuclear -  and 
rapidly decided -  war. Of course, Cold War responsibilities also 
meant that Canadian forces were required to participate in alliance 
activities. However, the Active Force, consisting mainly of the Mobile 
Striking Force and oriented to fulfill Canada’s share of continental 
defence requirements in line with the Basic Security Plan, amounted 
to the “rough equivalent of a brigade of troops.” Tasked with the 
dual role of handling continental and homeland defence, the force 
could not be deployed since it was already over-committed.9 For the 
Korean War, a two brigade-group force was raised “off the streets” 
using the legal term ‘Special Force’ since this was supposed to be a 
limited engagement for this particular operation. One brigade group 
acted as a manpower pool while the other, 25 Brigade, deployed to 
Korea. During the early stages of the Korean conflict (1950-1953), 
the government also deployed forces to Western Europe as part of 
n a t o , the army component being 27 Brigade. To be sure, this was 
a new type of conflict that was markedly dissimilar to the Second 
World War. The Cold War required standing forces both to deter 
enemy action and, in the event of a conflagration, hold ground until 
larger forces could be mobilized.10
8 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG 26 J4, The Papers of William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, Volume 318, File 3365 PJBD 1946-1948, “Memorandum by the 
Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee, “Implementation of the 
Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, 23 July 1947.
9 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 316.
10 Sean Maloney, War Without Battles : Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany 
(Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1997).
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With the growing threat of a nuclear war, however, a reserve 
force geared to longer term mobilization might have seemed a 
luxury in the minds of Army leadership, concentrating as it was on 
maintaining forces in-being at a high state of readiness.11 Studies led 
by Major-General Howard K. Anderson in 1954 and by Brigadier 
W.A.B. Anderson in 1957 examined the reserve forces. The Kennedy 
report proposed to rename the reserve force the Canadian Army 
(Militia), and to streamline the organization organize sothat it could 
more speedily mobilize a smaller number of units. The Anderson 
report, completed at the direction of the chief of the general staff, 
General Howard Graham, had a shorter term focus, to improve the 
militia’s capability to fill out the “1st Canadian Infantry Division 
on M-Day” and to provide “reinforcements for the 1st and 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Divisions and Corps troops at M plus 30 days.” 
The study also recommended that the militia perform civil defence 
tasks if necessary.12 Civil defence, as opposed to combat operations, 
would soon become the militia’s primary task, however, when John 
Diefenbaker’s Tories won the 1957 election, and Major-General 
George Pearkes became minister of national defence.
Pearkes strongly favoured a civil defence role for the Militia, a 
role that had been in the hands of the Department of National Health 
and Welfare since 1951.13 It was an opportune time for new ideas, 
because the enemy’s deployment of a thermonuclear capability and 
the means to use it against North America generated an even greater 
shift in emphasis toward continental defence. The air defence system 
absorbed the bulk of the defence budget. Projects like the Avro 
Arrow, Bomarc, and the sensor systems in the North took absolute 
priority. Consequently, an increasing amount of money was drained 
from supporting reserve forces. Mobilization was now considered a 
dead issue since there would not be enough time to mobilize during a 
nuclear war. In 1959, therefore, the Diefenbaker government assigned 
the role of civil defence and “national survival” duties to the Militia,
11 T.C. Willett, Canada’s Militia: A Heritage at Risk (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1987b 76.
12 Tamara Sherwin, “From Total War to Total Force : Civil-Military Relations and 
the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia) 1945-1995” (Master of Arts Thesis in History, 
University of New Brunswick, 1997), 70-75.
13 Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General 
George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), 
296-297.
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mainly among the combat arms units. Debate over the wisdom of 
that decision has since continued.14
Despite the internal military debates over roles and assigned 
resources, however, civil defence remained a serious national and 
strategic problem in the 1950s. Bureaucrats and military officers 
knew the necessity of rapid decision-making in the event of any type 
of nuclear exchange long before 1962, and increasingly acknowledged 
the requirement to accord the civil defence organization, housed in 
the Department of National Health and Welfare, higher status as 
an emergency measures organization.15 There was understanding 
within the Canadian bureaucracy that in a nuclear emergency the 
menace would be truly continental ; circumstances might preclude 
full consultation and consideration of options with US authorities. In 
January 1957, Arnold Heeney, then the ambassador in Washington, 
observed that “an occasion may arise where time does not permit 
consultation before the declaration of an alert because the imminence 
of attack seems to either Government to be a matter of hours rather 
than days.”16
Since 1947, therefore, Canadian civil and military leaders sought 
to develop a strategy that would either deter a nuclear attack or 
deal with its aftermath. In so doing, a series of plans were needed 
to mobilize national resources to meet these ends. Plans came in 
the form of the Government War Books. Indeed, the War Books 
represented early attempts to conceptualize the very significant 
problems associated with determining who was responsible for what 
in the case of an enemy attack. Recently, this kind of planning has 
re-emerged as the latest in a series of new and revolutionary concepts 
as “the Comprehensive Approach.”17
14 See, for example, John A. English, Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian 
Military Professionalism (Concord, ON: Irwin, 1998), 51-52; also see Andrew Burtch, 
Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2013), 138.
15 Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 73/1223 Raymont Papers, 
Memorandum from ESO to CCOS, “Report of Working Group on War Measures,” 
21 January 1957.
16 DHH, Raymont Papers, Series IV, File 2126. ADP Heeney, “Draft Letter to US 
Secretary of State,” January 1957.
17 Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Mr. Peter Gizewski, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Michael Rostek, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces 
Operations,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no.1 ; Joint Doctrine and Concepts 
Centre, “The Comprehensive Approach”, Joint Doctrinal Note 4/05 (Swindon: 
Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006); United States Department of Defense,
9
and : Advice and Indecision Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
At the top of the hierarchy was the Government of Canada War 
Book, which provided subordinate departments a framework within 
which to develop their own War Books. But given the responsibilities 
of the Department of National Defence in wartime, the Department of 
National Defence (d n d ) War Book was a close second in importance. 
The books laid out measures “to meet an emergency that might 
or does lead to war, and to assign responsibility for executing the 
measures.”18 In many ways, this was a true “whole of government” 
effort to mobilize national resources to respond to Soviet aggression, 
the lessons from which are something current concept developers 
should note when developing contemporary initiatives often touted as 
being revolutionary breaks with past experience.19 Those who argue 
for the revolutionary change in the complexity of operations in recent 
times, and the innovative nature of the required combined action by 
multiple departments and agencies are quite simply wrong.
The War Books were written to deal with threats that were, 
constantly in flux. For example, the first post-Second World War 
Government War Book was written in 1948 with the experience of 
that war in mind. Its authors, therefore, expected mobilization rather 
than large standing forces to be the norm. The speed with which 
major crises erupted in the late 1940s and 1950s, and, starting in the 
late 1950s, the possibility of a nuclear exchange by intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (i c b m ), rendered the mobilization concept largely 
irrelevant. Nonetheless, and contrary to the interpretation in key
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC, February 2010), 11.
18 DHH, Joint Staff Fonds, 2002/17, “The Department of National Defence War 
Book,” July 1961, 1.
19 Chief of Force Development, “The Future Security Environment 2007-2030, 
Part One” (Ottawa : unsigned draft dated 8 November 2008) ; US JFCOM “The 
Comprehensive Approach: A  Conceptual Framework for Multi-National Experiment 
5 -  A Summary Paper,” Suffolk : Joint Futures Lab, United States Joint Forces 
Command, November 2006, 1 ; US JFCOM “The Comprehensive Approach : A  
Conceptual Framework for Multi-National Experiment 5 -  A Summary Paper, 
Suffolk: Joint Futures Lab, United States Joint Forces Command, November 
2006 ; Chief of Force Development, “Objective Force 2028” (Ottawa: undated draft 
document); and Chief of Force Development, “Integrated Capstone Concept”, 
(Ottawa: draft document dated 30 June 2009), on page 26 refers to the period from 
1838-1989 as “Jominian and Simpler,” a completely indefensible and superficial 
characterisation of past experience. For a contrary position, one showing that these 
revolutionary concepts are no such thing, see Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, 
An Effects Based Approach to Operations in the Domestic and Continental 
Operating Environment: A Case for Pragmatism (Ottawa: DRDC CORA Technical 
Memorandum 2008-033, 2009).
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published works on the Cuban Missile Crisis, this article shows that 
the outdated War Books remained in effect until replacement versions 
were approved.20
The Government War Book stated in general terms the measures 
required in an emergency, and designated the department or agency 
of government responsible to execute these measures. The d n d  war 
book listed and described the measures for which the minister, the 
deputy minister, the chairman of the chiefs of staff, and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee (c o s c ) were responsible.21 The wording here is 
key, as a main theme in the Canadian historiography focuses on 
the perceived lack of authority on which defence minister Douglas 
Harkness raised readiness levels of the armed forces and authorized 
various other activities.22 The confusion that existed during the initial 
stages of the crisis shaped the subsequent action or lack of action.
After the briefing on 22 October 1962 by US special envoy 
Livingston Merchant on the planned US quarantine of Cuba, Harkness 
met with the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Chief 
Marshal Frank Miller, and told him to “order the Chiefs of Staff to put 
their forces on the ‘R E A D Y ’ state of alert.”23 According to Harkness, 
the chairman questioned whether this authority was available to the 
defence minister. The difficulty arose because the updated d n d  War 
Book, which included detailed descriptions of the circumstances in 
which the defence minister could raise the alert levels of the armed 
forces, had been under review by various government departments 
since at least early 1961, and had yet to be approved by Cabinet. 
Thus, as Harkness later state, “my legal right to take such action was
20 Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 96.
21 DHH, Joint Staff Fonds, 2002/17, “The Department of National Defence War 
Book,” July 1961, 1.
22 See David Welch’s review of “Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis : 
Canadian Involvement Reconsidered,” Journal of Conflict Studies 15, no.1 (Spring 
1995): 149-153 ; Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Pacific Historical Review 48, no.2 (May 1979) ; John 
Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent 
Allies (Athens GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997); Robert Reford, Canada 
and Three Crises (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968); J.L. 
Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United 
States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991); also see Peter Haydon, 
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 210.
23 LAC, MG 32, Papers of Douglas Harkness, Vol. 57, “The Nuclear Arms Question 
and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, 1963”, 8-9.
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not clear.”24 After a short discussion it was decided that this action 
needed to be cleared with the prime minister. This mistaken advice 
opened the way for extended debate at a time when united and timely 
action was needed both to defend the continent against a burgeoning 
threat, and to avoid the appearance of a divided Western alliance at 
a time of severe crisis.
The reasons for the need to revise both the d n d  and Government 
War Books were that the existing d n d  War Book presupposed a 
conventional war, and thus “policy guidance for a nuclear war was 
inadequate.” As well, the Canadian Formal Alert Measures dating 
from 1955 were “increasingly unrealistic to deal with the speed and 
decisiveness with which a nuclear attack [could] be delivered.”25 In 
this instance, capable planners had identified and looked for a means 
to overcome this weakness.
The planners believed that the declaration of a Formal Alert 
by the Government of Canada would take too much time, would 
unnecessarily alarm the public, and could increase international 
tensions. They proposed a series of revisions to the Cabinet Defence 
Committee for measures that could be taken without instituting a 
Formal Alert.26 These were the “States of Military Vigilance” to be 
ordered when the readiness of the forces needed to be raised, but where 
there was no need to begin mobilizing national resources for a war. 
It was noted at the time that there were several instances in which a 
“State of Military Vigilance” could have been applied appropriately, 
including the Suez and Lebanese crises, as well as those in the Congo 
and Laos.27 While there was a significant difference between incidents 
like the 1960 Congo crisis and a direct threat to North America from 
Soviet missiles in Cuba, what is interesting in these debates is the 
assumption that declaring a Formal Alert would alarm the public 
and increase international tensions. One wonders where this belief 
originated or whether any rigorous analysis went into its formulation,
24 Ibid.
25 DHH, Box 83, File 2002/17, Joint Staff Fonds, “Memorandum to The Minister : 
Revised DND War Book,” August 1961.
26 LAC, MG 32 Papers of Douglas Harkness, Vol. 57, “The Nuclear Arms Question 
and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, 1963”, 
11 ; LAC, RG2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Vol. 2752, File D-1-6-1, 
“Memorandum to Cabinet: Revised DND War Book, 9 January 1962.
27 DHH, Joint Staff Fonds, 2002/17, Box 83, Memorandum to the Minister, “Revised 
DND War Book”, p.2.
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or if this was another example of opinion becoming “received wisdom” 
that could not be challenged. In any event, the assessment of the 
speed at which a nuclear conflict could develop certainly was sound. 
At the very least, these beliefs drove the Joint Planning Committee 
to revise the d n d  alert measures.
Because of changes in the character of the threat, the Joint 
Planning Committee developed additional Canadian Forces States 
of Increased Military Vigilance to supplement the alert measures 
in the d n d  War Book. These new states would alert the forces 
“during a period of international tension prior to the declaration of 
an Alert by the Canadian Government.”28 The two proposed states 
of military vigilance, “Discreet” and “Ready,” would be called by 
the chiefs of staff, and the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee 
would inform the minister. The “Discreet” state of military vigilance 
would, amongst other things, require the services to review their 
emergency plans, place ships and aircraft on short notice to move, 
and increase the readiness of intelligence and communications 
facilities.29 The “Ready” state of military vigilance increased force 
protection measures at bases and defence installations, cancelled 
military leave, deployed mobile and alternate headquarters, alerted 
standby battalions for deployment, and brought units up to wartime 
strength. These states of military vigilance were designed for use 
prior to implementation of the existing Canadian formal alert levels of 
Simple, Reinforced, and General alerts which could only be declared 
with the approval of the Federal Cabinet.30 Before these amendments 
were made, the War Books simply did not meet the requirements of 
the threat environments the country faced. The point here is that 
changes were made to the War Books in force during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis : the military and political leadership could have used 
the measures without Cabinet approval.
The “States of Military Vigilance” applied only to the armed 
forces, and were similar to those adopted by the major n a t o  command 
areas. These states provided for precautionary measures that could 
be taken by the r c a f , Canadian Army, and r c n  in Canada during
28 LAC, RG 24, Department of National Defence Records, Vol. 549 File 096 103 
v.3, Joint Planning Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Canadian Forces 
States of Increased Military Vigilance, 23 December 1958.”
29 Ibid.
Ibid.
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periods of heightened international tension. They consisted only 
of military measures, and could be ordered by the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee prior to the declaration of a formal alert by the Canadian 
Government. The Formal Alert Stage was still to be declared by the 
Government, but confusion existed over what measures were available 
to senior military and civilian leadership to act when needed.31 Thus, 
as Harkness later recalled, Miller’s contention that the minister’s legal 
right to take such action was not clear, and the decision to first clear 
this action with Diefenbaker.32 3Aside from the seeming confusion by 
both the senior civilian and military leadership over what measures 
were available to the chiefs of staff and the minister of national defence 
is the curious temerity of a military leader in giving an unsolicited 
legal opinion to the civilian authority. Regardless, any attempt to 
understand the sophistication of Canadian strategic thinking at the 
time must include an analysis of the measures that were in place and 
the reasons for the confusion at this critical juncture. Such analysis 
must also engage the accepted national narrative, which misinterprets 
this central aspect of Canadian involvement in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.
One of the most commonly cited sources is Peter Haydon’s The 
1962 Cuban Missile C r is is3  In his discussion of the Canadian crisis 
management system, Haydon outlines the five alert phases proposed 
in the July 1961 version of the d n d  War Book, which had not been 
approved by Cabinet before the crisis began. Indeed, it was only 
after three days of delay during which the entire Cabinet debated 
how Canada would respond that the Cabinet Defence Committee 
finally met and the Minister of National Defence raised the War Book 
matter. On 25 October 1962, after nearly nine months’ deferment of 
a decision “to allow time for further study by other departments” 
the Cabinet Defence Committee finally “approved in principle the 
Department of National Defence War Book, including the concept of 
States of Military Vigilance,” but with a curious provision that “the 
Minister of National Defence would obtain the approval of the Prime
31 LAC, RG2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Vol. 2752, File D-1-6-1, 
“Memorandum to Cabinet: Revised DND War Book,” 9 January 1962.
32 LAC, MG 32 Papers of Douglas Harkness, Vol. 57, “The Nuclear Arms Question 
and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, 1963,” 9.
33 Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement 
Reconsidered.
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 23 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol23/iss1/2
Minister before declaring a Ready State of Military-Vigilance.”34 This 
requirement, which speaks volumes about the nature of Canadian 
strategic culture, stood in defiance of the entire reason for changing 
the War Book : the need for speed and decisiveness in response to 
attack. However, what Haydon’s analysis misses is that a half-step 
towards this crisis system had been taken.
Harkness and Miller’s confusion following Merchant’s briefing 
regarding what measures were available to the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and the minister of national defence is perplexing given 
the recent developments regarding alert measures. According to 
the Canadian Arm y’s director of military operations and planning 
(d m o & p ), the states of military vigilance (discreet and ready) “were 
adopted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 18 Jun 1959.”35 These 
were exclusively military measures and could “be ordered by the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee prior to the declaration of a formal alert 
by the Canadian Government.” He wrote that those states of military 
vigilance had “been added to the d n d  War Book by Amendment No.1 
dated 21 Dec 59,”36 which means those measures had been approved 
by the Government of Canada. This contradicts an observation made 
by another scholar of the period, Sean Maloney, who argued that 
the “Chiefs of Staff approved these new States of Military Vigilance 
in July 1959,” but that they do “not appear to have been referred 
to Cabinet for approval.”37 Again, while Maloney correctly analyzes 
the evidence he cited, the fact remains that he, like Haydon, has not 
accounted for the amendments made to the 1955 d n d  War Book 
which, although not perfect, would have allowed Miller to act as 
Harkness wished.
Haydon’s account does, however, assert that “the war books 
had been withdrawn for updating” and that they “could only be put 
back into force by cabinet direction.”38 He reiterated this conclusion
34 LAC, Record Group 2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, The one hundred 
and thirty-seventh meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 October 1962, 2.
35 DHH, File 115.3M1.009 (D6), Colonel AJB Bailey, Director Military Operations 
and Planning, “Draft Amendment -  Army War Book, States of Military Vigilance,” 
12 February 1960.
36 Ibid.
37 Sean Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the 
Cold War (Dulles VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 192.
38 Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement 
Reconsidered, 96.
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in an article published in for The Northern Mariner in 2008.39 In 
both cases Haydon provides no substantiation for this assertion, and 
the available evidence shows that the problems were not due to the 
lack of an authorized d n d  War Book, but rather to the confusion 
or outright misunderstanding of the measures available to senior 
leadership. At the very least, Haydon’s assertion that the War Books 
had been withdrawn for updating seems a misreading of the available 
record. It made no sense to withdraw the War Books from service 
while debating even significant updates. Had war erupted before 
completing this exercise, which lasted from roughly mid-1960 to 
late 1962, the government would have been left without a coherent 
response plan. This simply would not have been a rational move, and 
there is sufficient evidence showing the War Books remained in effect 
throughout the crises, even if they needed updating. A  memorandum 
to the minister in August 1961 supports the argument that the War 
Books were in effect during the crisis. It states that in “1955, d n d  
adopted the War Books currently in use in the Department for the 
development of emergency defence plans and for their execution when 
the need should arise.” Additionally, on 25 October the Vice Chief of 
the Air Staff noted that the “Air Staff has gone over the War Book with 
the Minister,” indicating the War Books were in effect.40 Moreover, 
as early as 1948 the early post-war version of the Government War 
Book was submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee for approval 
despite the document not being “well balanced or complete.” The 
planners advised that despite “these shortcomings, it should form a 
useful framework for further planning, which in turn should permit 
its progressive revision.”41 Thus, the tradition was to keep even 
imperfect plans in place until revised, and not, as Haydon argues, to 
remove them from service altogether.
Further evidence that the d n d  War Book had not been taken 
out of service before the crisis can be seen in communication to 
the US government from the clerk of the privy council and cabinet 
secretary, R.B. Bryce, on 24 October 1962, a day before the Cabinet
39 Peter T. Haydon, “Canadian Involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis Re­
Reconsidered,” The Northern Mariner XVII, no.2 (April 2007): 60.
40 DHH, 79/469 Folder 26, Air Vice-Marshal M.M. Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary 
October 1962, Thursday, 25 October 1962.
41 LA C , Record Group 2 Vol. 2750, File VI, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, 
Memorandum For Cabinet Defence Committee: Government War Book, September 1948.
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Defence Committee approved the revised d n d  War Book.42 The US 
ambassador in Ottawa advised the secretary of state that Bryce had
told [him] confidentially that Cabinet had authorized Defence Minister 
Harkness to invoke for Canadian Air Force (NORAD only) “ready 
phase of military vigilance” to bring Canadian force at NORAD into 
line with US forces.” General James informs me that this is equivalent 
to US DEFCON 3 which is present stage our forces. James informed by 
Defence Ministry that Canadian forces NORAD have been authorized 
to assume NORAD DEFCON 3.43
Had the War Books been withdrawn from service, the Cabinet 
could not have done so until after the Cabinet Defence Committee 
approved the d n d  War Book the following day. When the decision 
was finally taken, it was not to restore the War Books but rather to 
approve the series of updates that had been pending for some time. 
Ultimately, and something demonstrating a lack of appreciation for 
the needed changes, the decision taken was a retrograde step due to 
the curious provision that “the Minister of National Defence would 
obtain the approval of the Prime Minister before declaring a Ready 
State of Military-Vigilance.”44
A  key point to understanding the confusion that occurred 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis was that the major revision of the 
1955 War Book planned for 1961 was not, as some authors argue, 
about adopting the new alert system but rather over making clear 
distinctions between the categories of alert. The 1959 amendment to 
the d n d  War Book which brought the new alert system into effect 
contained a “certain amount of duplication particularly between 
“Discreet” vigilance measures and “Simple” alert measures,” and the 
“major revision of the DND War Book ... [was] to remove these 
discrepancies and to bring the War Book into line with current
42 LAC, Record Group 2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, The one hundred 
and thirty-seventh meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 October 1962, 2.
43 US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 59, General 
Records of the Department of State, Records Relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
1962-1963, Telegram From Ambassador White to the Secretary of State, 24 October 
1962.
44 LAC, Record Group 2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, The one hundred 
and thirty-seventh meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 October 1962, 2.
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concepts.”45 The updates to these measures were proposed in mid- 
1961, but reflecting a lack of appreciation of the threats faced, the 
debate continued into late 1962. This was not, however, due to the 
War Books having been withdrawn from service, nor was it because 
the measures had not been approved. The only issue was that the 
existing measures were a bit confusing and had some wrinkles to 
be ironed out. Because of this, and seemingly because of a lack of 
awareness of the 1959 update to the d n d  War Book which allowed 
the c o s c  to raise the readiness level of the c f , Miller told Harkness 
that “the new War Book covering the instances in which the Minister 
of Defence had authority for this action had not yet been approved 
by Cabinet.”46 While this statement was not incorrect, it served to 
obfuscate the fact that the c o s c  had the authority, granted them by 
the 21 December 1959 amendment to the 1955 d n d  War Book, to act.
Thus, when Harkness told Miller to raise the alert level of 
the armed forces to a “Ready” state of military vigilance, while it 
may not technically have been the responsibility of the minister of 
national defence with the procedures then in place, the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee certainly could have done so. As Miller should have 
known, the measures adopted by the chiefs of staff in June of 1959 
and by amendment to the d n d  War Book in December, made it 
quite clear that this responsibility was vested in the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and could be used prior to the declaration of a general 
alert by the Government of Canada. Doing so would have avoided 
the entire mess of long Cabinet debates involving ministers with no 
real appreciation of defence issues. If Harkness’ account is correct, the 
question then becomes : why did Miller give the advice that he did? 
After all, Miller had been deputy minister of National Defence when 
these measures were adopted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
later that year as an amendment to the d n d  War Book, and must 
have been aware of the changes.47 Possibly the debate and significant
45 DHH, File 115.3M1.009 (D6), Colonel AJB Bailey, Director Military Operations 
and Planning, “Draft Amendment -  Army War Book, States of Military Vigilance,” 
12 February 1960.
46 LAC, MG 32 Papers of Douglas Harkness, Vol. 57, “The Nuclear Arms Question 
and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, 1963.”
47 LAC, RG2, Records of the Privy Council Office, Cabinet Defence Committee 
meetings. The records of these meetings show Mr. Miller’s attendance as Deputy 
Minister of National Defence.
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delay over the adoption of the revised version of the d n d  War Book 
pushed these developments out of mind.
If there was a time for the chiefs of staff to use their initiative 
and the authority granted to them by the revised d n d  War Book, it 
was in October 1962. The threat posed by the missiles in Cuba was 
as much a military threat to Canada as it was to the United States. 
The US military posture, including c i n c  n o r a d ’s  repeated requests 
to the Chiefs of Staff Committee to raise the readiness levels of the 
Canadian assets over which he theoretically had operational control, 
demanded a concomitant increase in the Canadian forces’ readiness 
to demonstrate that there were no cracks in the Western Alliance that 
the Soviets might exploit.48 Yet, whether because of political pressure 
or because of a lack of awareness of the measures available, the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee failed to act. Moreover, Diefenbaker assumed that 
the practices of the n a t o  alliance, of which he incorrectly felt n o r a d  
was a part, entitled him to be consulted on any proposed course of 
action that would involve raising readiness of the Canadian armed 
forces.49
Failing to do so led directly to the needless Cabinet debate 
on 23-24 October. While the debate continued the degree of 
disappointment of the US leadership was apparent. Assistant US 
Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland, then working very closely with 
the US ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, reported 
to the White House on 24 October 1962 that the “Canadians are still 
pressing their resolution holding everything up until observers are 
sent to check accuracy of the President’s statement.”50 The report 
went on to comment that Cleveland “thinks we will have more
48 DHH 79/469, Air Vice Marshal M.M. Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary, 25 October 
1962, Record of Conversation between Vice Chief of the Air Staff and Air Officer 
Commanding Air Defence Command, 25 October 1962.
49 Charles Foulkes, “Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,” Behind the Headlines 
2, no.1 (May 1961); 12; Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, “Continental Defence: 
‘Like farmers whose lands have a common concession line,’ ” in David S. McDonough, 
ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-g/11 World: Treaties, Interests, and 
Threats (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 120.
50 John F Kennedy Presidential Library (JFK), Papers of John F. Kennedy, National 
Security Files, Countries-Cuba-Night Log, 10/04/62-10/30/62, Memorandum for 
MacGeorge Bundy, Night Log, 24 October 1962; Diefenbaker Canada Centre (DCC), 
MG01XIIC120 Volume 56, Memorandum for the Minister, Cuba, 24 October 1962, 4.
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trouble from the Canadians.”61 The frustration with what the 
Americans viewed as foot-dragging by the Canadians reflects a very 
different threat perception -  both of the Soviet Union in general and 
this incident specifically -  between the political leadership of each 
country. Had the Canadian chiefs of staff exercised the authority 
vested in them, this strain in relations could have been avoided.
The literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Canadian hesitation 
and delay in closing ranks with our most important ally at a critical 
time has left many questions unanswered. Published works point 
to confusion at the highest levels of the Canadian government, but 
do not sufficiently account for it. The literature either misinterprets 
what could have been done or places the blame for the government’s 
delay on the lack of an approved d n d  War Book. This study has 
shown that the Chiefs of Staff Committee had ample means to raise 
the readiness levels of all services without appealing to Cabinet. 
Scholars have delighted in castigating Diefenbaker for his mistakes 
while overlooking the military leadership’s role in the crisis.
Another common issue in the scholarship is whether measures 
taken by commanders outside of Ottawa prior to the belated 
authorization of increased readiness, and the pressure exerted by 
the chiefs of staff that ultimately brought the Cabinet to give that 
authority reflected the collapse of civilian control of the military. 
This paper has shown that the chiefs of staff could in fact have raised 
readiness levels to match those of the US without Cabinet approval, 
and offers an explanation of why this did not happen. That raises a 
higher level question : What apparatus was in place to support the 
prime minister with the information he needed for decision making? 
It has been argued here that ill-informed military advice provided to 
the minister of national defence stymied further dialogue with the 
prime minister on what could and should be done.
Therefore, this study challenges the argument, made by Peter 
Haydon for example, that had Diefenbaker only sought and considered 51*
51 JFK, Papers of John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries -  Cuba -
Night Log, 10/04/62-10/30/62, Memorandum for MacGeorge Bundy, Night Log, 24
October 1962.
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advice from Canadian military leaders on their perception of the 
situation, there would have been less needless delay. While there is 
some truth to this contention, it ignores the fact that the military 
itself was misguided on a question as simple as the status of its own 
War Book. Even so, while it is stunning that the chairman of the 
chiefs of staff Committee would tell the minister of national defence 
that the military could not act when there clearly were measures in 
place to do so, it is equally alarming that the civilian leadership was 
no better informed or interested in investigating further.
The incident served as a stark reminder of the need for a 
national security apparatus to bring forward to decision-makers in 
a timely fashion all relevant information. This is not to suggest that 
information and advice will necessarily be heeded, or that it will 
bring Canadian political leadership into line with their American 
and other alliance counterparts. Rather, the process through which 
this full information is developed and presented to senior leadership 
increases the likelihood that military and political leaders will develop 
a coherent, well grounded perception of a threat. How that threat is 
dealt with will be the subject of debate, but with the advantage 
of a deeper understanding of what are very complex matters. The 
alternative is incoherence, as was the case in October 1962. In the 
absence of a rigorous and expert-driven national security structure, 
military and political leaders were too easily able to accept reasons to 
justify inaction in the face of a grave threat to North America.
While personalities inevitably influence events, the lack of 
rigour in the system did nothing to soften the sharp edges of wilful 
characters and clashes among them since it did not force realistic and 
timely assessments of the nation’s geostrategic imperatives, or of the 
developing threat from Soviet missiles in Cuba. Indeed, a degree of 
laziness in strategic thinking, enhanced by the slow move away from 
a mobilization paradigm to one with large forces in-being, had crept 
into the nation’s planning and analysis of the likely nature of the next 
conflict. The American “essence of decision,” while far from perfect, 
attempted to understand the context, the adversary’s perspective, 
and tried to apply a degree of rigour to the decision-making process 
that may have prevented the crisis from developing into a major war. 
The “essence” of Canada’s decision was even further from perfection 
-  bad military advice leading to needless debate by a government 
more concerned with a perceived slight over lack of prior consultation 
and longer term policy disagreements instead of dealing appropriately
21
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with a clear and present danger to both Canada and the United 
States.
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